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Abstract Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can
philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In
order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go
about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions:
a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological
questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we
should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we
are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so,
we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what
we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning
how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.
1 Introduction
The study of intuitions and their role in philosophy has recently occupied the
limelight in philosophical methodology, and evaluative methodology is no excep-
tion. Evaluative methodology considers aspects of philosophical practice, such as
thought experiments or appeals to theoretical virtues, and asks whether they de-
serve a positive or negative evaluation in some terms or other, e.g., reliability.
Some give negative evaluations of intuitions and their use in philosophy, others
defend against those negative evaluations.1
One can evaluate intuitions in different ways. The terms and the target of
the evaluation can vary. By the terms of an evaluative methodology, I mean the
terms in which we are to perform the evaluation. It is, of course, very important
to specify the terms. Do we want an evaluation in terms of fallibility, coherence,
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1 For a helpful introduction, read Pust (2012). Negative positions include those of experi-
mental philosophers, but others as well (e.g., Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Cummins 1998;
Haslanger 2006; Hintikka 1999; Kornblith 2007; Machery et al. 2004; Mallon et al. 2009; Nichols,
Stich, and Weinberg 2003; Weinberg 2007; Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; Weinberg et al.
Draft of 2006). Intuitions have been defended on a number of bases (e.g., Bengson 2012; Nagel,
2012; Shieber 2012; Sosa 2009).
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beauty, reliability. . . what? What counts as a merit of philosophical practice? While
specifying the terms is important, we also need to know what it is we are to evaluate
in those terms, i.e., we also need to know what the target of our evaluation is to
be. What aspect of philosophical practice are we to evaluate? Inductive reasoning?
Deference to Lewis? Note that saying ‘those aspects involving intuitions’ doesn’t
completely settle this issue. Are we to directly target intuitions themselves or their
use? Are we to evaluate all intuitions, or, e.g., only the ones philosophers use?2 It
will not always be possible to know exactly what we will end up targeting from
the outset. Nonetheless, we need to know how we will identify our target; it would
be good to have what we might call a targeting strategy.
When setting about evaluative methodology, it is important to think about
the terms and target of one’s evaluation. One reason is clarity. A conclusion like
‘intuitions are good/no good’ might otherwise be open to many interpretations. It
is good practice to state conclusions clearly and unambiguously. However, there
is also something more important at stake. Which of the various ways we might
evaluate intuitions is the best? The question this paper aims to address is a ques-
tion about how to pursue evaluative methodology and in that sense at least we
might call it a metamethodological one.3 The metamethodological question is:
(a) How should we go about evaluating intuition-using philosophy?
The answer to questions of this form, i.e., questions like ‘How should we go
about doing x?’, is often, ‘It depends’. In particular, the answer often seems to
depend on what motivates our interest in doing x in the first place. For example,
how one should practice one’s scales depends on whether one aims to be a jazz
pianist or a baroque harpsichord player. For another, suppose I run into your study
and ask the best way to hide a body. You should try to find out why I want to
know. ‘Throw a coat over it’ will count as a bad answer if I am looking to avoid
arrest for murder, but a perfectly satisfactory answer if I simply don’t like the look
of the thing and want it out of sight.
I am inclined to think that our metamethodological question is no different.
There are various more general aims one might have which motivate an interest
in evaluating philosophical methods and which of these one has affects how one
should evaluate. If you want an evaluation of philosophical methods in order to
help weed out overly expensive ways of doing philosophy, then your evaluation
better be in terms of economic efficiency—whatever that would mean.4
2 The thought that we should concentrate on the intuitions philosophers use is the idea
behind the ‘expertise defence’ advanced and defended by a number of philosophers in response
to challenges by experimental philosophers (Andow forthcoming; Hales 2006; Horvath 2010;
Kauppinen 2007; Ludwig 2007; Singer 1982, 2005; Sosa 2010; Williamson 2005; Williamson
2007, 2011).
3 I don’t intend to defend a principled positive account of the distinction between method-
ology and metamethodology, neither do I need to for my purposes. The point is simply to take
a step back from particular projects in evaluative methodology and consider how such projects
are best approached. The label ‘metamethodology’ provides a useful way to captures this for
me. Use of this label doesn’t commit me to saying generally that ‘how should we evaluate x?’
is a meta[something] question.
4 One might think that it is not what motivates you but what should motivate you which
matters. For example, regardless of whether you want cheaper philosophy, perhaps you really
ought to want more consistent philosophy. I am not sure about this. However, if that is right,
then what I say in the rest of the paper still follows. This is due to the minimal/non-substantive
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The aim of this paper then is to reflect on what we might call the motivational
question and ask what this can tell us about how the evaluation of intuition-using
methods in philosophy should be conducted. The motivational question is the
following:
(b) What do we want from an evaluation of intuition-using philosophy?
This paper advances and explores one answer to the motivational question.
The answer it advances is broadly that we want our evaluative methodology to
help us do better philosophy. I argue that reflecting on this answer allows us
to settle three particular issues concerning how evaluative methodologists should
think about intuitions when going about their evaluation. These are the following
(for now, they involve some unfamiliar terms): (i) whether we should have a thick
or a thin conception of intuitions when doing evaluative methodology; (ii) whether
we should evaluate intuitions monolithically; and (iii) what the best way to carve
a monolith is. My answers will be roughly that we should approach the evaluation
of intuitions with a thin conception of intuition, prepared to carve up intuitions
rather than treat them monolithically and that we should be prepared to carve
to any distinction so long as we can make that distinction in the course of our
everyday philosophising.
It is never too early to see off an obvious objection. Why think that metamethod-
ological reflection is necessary in order to work out how methodologists should think
about intuitions? We can agree that perhaps the terms of one evaluation depend on
what one wants from an evaluation (if you want cheaper philosophy, evaluate in some
economic terms). What, however, can be wrong with the idea that our first step in eval-
uating intuition-use in philosophy simply has be to identify the target—to identify what
intuitions are, e.g., to determine to which mental state(s) philosophers refer to when
they use the word ‘intuition’? The answer is that there is nothing intrinsically wrong
with such an approach. It is just that it seems to be rather difficult. Conflicting
ways of thinking about intuitions and their use abound in philosophy. Genuine
intuitions are variously hailed to involve peculiar seemings, be a type of belief,
be non-beliefs, be immediate judgements about cases, be reflective judgements, be
largely innate, be wholely acquired, and so on. Evaluative methodology has a habit
of stagnating—to get bogged-down in debates about whether one or other party
involved is characterising intuitions correctly (for some examples of the types of
debate I have in mind see §6, p.13). Time gets spent in debates about whether
experimental philosophers tap intuitions and what sorts of things intuitions are,
for instance—debates which appear to be making at most slow progress—rather
than in activities which provide lots of concrete advice on how to do philosophy
better.
My project in this paper—taking a step back to do some metamethodolog-
ical reflection—is motivated by a desire for a different approach. I want to be
able to approach evaluative methodology of intuitions without having to become
embroiled in tricky (and at times, one suspects, intractable) debates about what
intuitions really are.5 This paper demonstrates that such an approach is possi-
nature of the motivation I consider in the next section. It doesn’t really seem plausible to say
that one’s interest in evaluative methodology ought not to be motivated by wanting philosophy
to be done well (where this is neutral as to precise axiology).
5 Not that tricky debates should always be avoided in philosophy. The rationale is that when
debate A is very tricky (and is suspected to be intractable), settling debate A is unnecessary
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ble and makes concrete recommendations about how evaluative methodologists
should think about intuitions. The take-home message is that we don’t have to
have a fully developed account of intuitions—one which will hold its own out-
side of evaluative methodology, e.g., when taxonomising mental kinds—in order
to productively evaluate philosophical methods where intuitions are concerned.
One can put other debates about how to characterise intuitions aside when doing
evaluative methodology and resolve to simply characterise intuitions in the way
which will set up one’s evaluative project to give useful information about how
to do philosophy better. This doesn’t commit one to using that characterisation
when doing philosophy of mind or when theorising about our basic sources of war-
rant. Neither does this commit one to thinking that the relevant characterisation
is the all things considered best account of what intuitions really are. The issue of
how to think about intuition when doing evaluative methodology can be treated
as completely ancillary to the question of what intuitions are really; philosophers
who have divergent and irreconcilable views about what intuitions really are can
nonetheless agree with me about how we should think about intuitions when doing
evaluative methodology.
2 What do we want from an evaluation of intuition-using philosophy?
Let’s grant that philosophers do use intuitions (given some reading of ‘intuitions’).6
Why would we evaluate that use? Why would we value the evaluation of extant
philosophical practice? Why would we be interested in finding out which methods
are good ones and which ones bad (in whichever terms)? I offer the following as
the most plausible motivation: we want to do the best we can as philosophers; we
want to be responsible philosophers; and, if we worry about whether our methods
are any good, it is because we want to know whether we should be giving them
up, using other ones, or improving our practice.7
I appreciate that this is a fairly minimal/non-substantive suggestion. This
might seem problematic. The thought might be, perhaps, that it isn’t clear what
the motivation really amounts to. It is of course true that ‘wanting to do philoso-
phy better’ really doesn’t conflict with any other ideas one might have about what
constitutes better philosophy or other motivations one might have for getting in-
volved in evaluative methodology. For example, you might get involved because
you want methods which give you lots of true beliefs, but, if you do, you presum-
ably think that philosophy which arrives at true beliefs is better philosophy than
that which doesn’t, all else being equal. So the motivation ‘wanting to do philoso-
for making progress in debate B, and debate B is really what you want to settle, in that case
there is good reason for you to avoid debate A.
6 The assumption that intuition-use is extant practice is fairly innocuous, as I do not suppose
any particular account of what intuitions are or how philosophers use them. Philosophers
definitely use the word ‘intuition’ in their philosophising. Indeed in some analytic publications
the proportion of papers, in the period 2000-2009, indulging in intuition-talk is over 85%
(Andow 2015). It is interesting to note that although the evaluation of extant practice is more
interesting than that of how philosophy is done in some science fiction version of the profession
is less interesting, the evaluation of non-extant practices, e.g., historical methods may be of
some interest.
7 I write in the first person plural. If your interest in having better methods is purely selfish,
much the same lessons follow—just translate into the singular.
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phy better’ doesn’t conflict with the motivation ‘wanting true beliefs’. But neither
would it conflict with ‘wanting false beliefs’ And it is easy to see that the same
goes for other motivations ‘wanting philosophy to cause lots of deaths’, ‘wanting
beautiful philosophy’, and ‘wanting philosophy done by shiny people’.
My suggestion really is that minimal/non-substantive. But, this is okay. There
is no cause for worry. I am not aiming to give any account of what makes a
philosophical method good or better than another. I understand that saying ‘I
want better philosophy’ won’t help you sort between philosophical methods unless
you have an accompanying axiology. But that’s okay, because I am not trying to
sort between philosophical methods. I am trying to sort between ways of doing
evaluative methodology.8 And, as we will see, the mere idea that the reason we want
to do evaluative methodology has something to do with wanting the best methods
(regardless of what one thinks the best methods actually are) does help us do just
that—does help us sort between ways of doing evaluative methodology.
The main insight this suggestion provides is the following: if you are motivated
as I suggest, then you should evaluate methods in such a way that its deliverances
can help us be more responsible philosophers (if this is possible)—whatever you
happen to think makes a responsible philosopher. Accordingly, we want evaluations
that we can use to guide our practice. It should be fairly clear that it would be
a fantastic shame if, when we go away and evaluate our methods or some aspect
of our methods negatively, we were not able to use any information resulting
from that process of evaluation to, for instance, take evasive action—even if that
evaluation is accurate.9 If a set of intuitions is negatively evaluated, we ideally
want to be able to form ameliorative strategies using that information. A strategy
of evaluation which doesn’t provide any information which is useful in this way just
doesn’t do what it was we wanted evaluative methodology to do for us. Moreover,
given a choice between two strategies of evaluation, the one which provides the
more useful information is the better strategy.
Consider the following example. Suppose that 5% of our intuitions result from
the activity of an evil demon who tries to deceive us, the remaining 95% of intu-
itions are highly reliable, but that we don’t have the resources to determine which
particular intuitions result from evil demon activity. Suppose now that we do some
evaluative methodology and find out the following piece of information: intuitions
which result from evil demon activity oughtn’t to be trusted. While our evalua-
tive methodology may produce results which are epistemologically sound—it may
be true that we ought not to trust these intuitions—this information would not
enable us to take any appropriate evasive action (one could avoid intuition-use
entirely, but this would mean abandoning a lot of good sources of evidence). Of
course, the information we receive about the demon isn’t completely useless. Some
action seems appropriate on receiving this information, e.g., reducing the extent
to which we trust intuitions by some relevant margin. However, compared with an
evaluation which allows us to identify the problematic intuitions, the information
about the demon is a poor substitute.
8 We could quibble about how to divide up the territory here. Methods of metaphilosophy
are philosophical methods, might be the thought. Be that as it may, I take it the distinction
I intend to track here is clear.
9 Of course, if you have some other motivation, then this might be no problem at all.
6 James Andow
In the following, I argue this has a number of implications for how we ought
to conduct an evaluation of intuition-use in philosophy. In particular, I argue this
motivation helps us settle three issues. Let’s consider the first.
3 Thick or Thin
When one sets out to evaluate intuitions, it is important to know what you mean
by ‘intuitions’. Philosophers have famously characterised intuitions in a number of
different ways and it is important to know which of these (or which other) one is
using. One important distinction here is that between thick and thin conceptions of
intuition (this distinction is introduced by Weinberg and Alexander forthcoming).
The question is whether we should approach the evaluation of intuitions with a
thick or a thin conception of intuitions.
Let’s be clear about the distinction. Thin conceptions identify intuitions merely
as ‘instances of some fairly generic and epistemologically uncontroversial category
of mental states or episodes’ (forthcoming, §1). Weinberg and Alexander identify
Williamson as a proponent of a thin conception of intuitions. Williamson (2007)
‘encourages a . . . view according to which intuitions are (at most) just judgements
or inclinations to judge’ (forthcoming, §2). (Weinberg and Alexander also cite
Lewis 1983, van Inwagen 1997, Cappelen 2012, and Buckwalter & Stich 2010,
as being proponents of thin conceptions.) On the other hand, thick conceptions
are less inclusive and impose some restrictions. Various restrictions which might
be imposed include: having a particular (perhaps special) type of content (e.g.,
BonJour 1998; Sosa 1998); having some distinctive phenomenology (e.g., Bealer
1998; Bengson 2012); or having a particular etiology or deriving from a conceptual
competence (e.g., Ludwig 2007; Sosa 1998; Bealer 1998; Kauppinen 2007 – these
are Weinberg and Alexander’s examples).
What is at stake in approaching the evaluation of intuitions with a relatively
thin/thick conception of intuitions? Helpfully, Weinberg and Alexander (forthcom-
ing) consider a number of relevant consequences of conceiving of intuitions thinly
and thickly respectively. Their discussion occurs in the context of a rather different
question, however, so we’ll permit ourselves a quick digression to say something
about their project, before noting how the considerations they make are relevant
to our metamethodological question.
*
Weinberg and Alexander’s discussion relates to the recent empirical challenge to
the reliability of intuitions. The supposed evidence that intuitions are unreliable
comes mainly from survey-based studies conducted by experimental philosophers.
Weinberg and Alexander note an interesting dialectical tension in relation to this
empirical challenge:
It seems that philosophers face a dilemma on a sliding scale: the thinner
their conception of philosophical intuition, the more clearly they are chal-
lenged by recent work in experimental philosophy; the thicker their concep-
tion of philosophical intuition, the more likely they are to incur different
kinds of methodological problems and the harder it will be to tell when
anyone is doing philosophy correctly. (p.20, prepublication copy)
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The basic thought is that it is fairly safe to infer facts about participant’s judge-
ments, inclinations to judge, beliefs or inclinations to believe, etc., from the results
of surveys. Consequently, if intuitions are conceived thinly then it is easy to use
surveys to find out about participant’s intuitions (pace worries such as those of
Cummins 2009). But, thick conceptions make the inference rather more tenuous.
Once one starts to add etiological or phenomenological restrictions, for instance,
it is less clear that surveys reveal much about intuitions; for, we know little about
participants’ phenomenology or where their judgements come from. A result of
this is that intuitions thickly conceived are not as directly open to the empirical
threat.
Nonetheless, Weinberg and Alexander note a number of reasons to think that
those with a thick conception of intuitions still do not have an effective way to
resist the empirical challenge. I’ll look at two main reasons here.10
(1) Thick characterisations don’t always paint a very rosy picture of traditional
philosophical practice. On certain thick conceptions – particularly etiological ap-
proaches – it is very unclear how we would be able to reliably tell the difference
between intuitions and non-intuitions from the armchair. The origins of our in-
tuitions are typically fairly opaque to us, at least from the armchair. In fact,
intuitions are often characterised as not resulting from conscious reasoning pro-
cesses (e.g., Gopnik & Schwitzgebel 1998; Mercier & Sperber 2008; Nahmias et
al. 2006). If such a conception were to be insisted upon, one might be able to
successfully defend the practice of relying on intuitions, but only at the expense
of granting that it is very difficult to work out when philosophers are engaging in
that practice.
(2) In order to resist the challenge it seems that you must have some reason
to think intuitions as you thickly characterise them do not exhibit the same prob-
lematic effects that show up in the empirical evidence. If one thermometer of a
batch is faulty, pointing out that the rest of the batch may not be faulty is not
good enough unless one can provide reason to think the faultiness is isolated. In
the case of thermometers, such reasons may be forthcoming. Perhaps the glass has
shattered in a way which doesn’t indicate that the crate was dropped. However,
some ways of characterising intuitions thickly, seem to have quite the opposite
feature. There is positive reason to expect intuitions, given typical phenomenolog-
ical or etiological restrictions, won’t be immune from problematic effects. First,
Weinberg and Alexander discuss Bengson’s (2012) proposal that genuine intuitions
strike us a certain way which they identify with the tradition of talk of intellectual
seemings. They present evidence that the types of psychological mechanism whose
deliverances are typically associated with seemings are also typically susceptible
to epistemically worrying effects, e.g., framing effects. Second, they discuss con-
ceptual competence views, and note that how much cause for optimism those with
such a view have depends on what theory of concepts is assumed. The problem is,
firstly, that the prominent empirically plausible accounts of concepts,
10 Weinberg and Alexander also note the further worry that insofar as any defence is supposed
be a defence of traditional or current philosophical practice, those using thicker conceptions,
e.g., intuitions*, run the danger of missing their target, as philosophers show few signs of using
intuitions*. For, consider some of the various ‘thickeners’: having a deep sense of necessity,
or being the result of conceptual competence. It might be thought rather implausible that
currently or traditionally philosophers show a great deal of sensitivity to whether a judgement
is accompanied by such a phenomenology or has resulted of a true conceptual competence.
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“. . . attribute structures to the mind that are themselves contextually sen-
sitive and widely variable across both individuals and populations – for
example, theories according to which our concepts contain representations
of exemplars . . . or theories according to which sensitivity to contextual
factors is practically a defining characteristic” (Weinberg and Alexander,
forthcoming, pp. 16-17).
And, secondly, that to defend intuition-use while relying upon an alternative ac-
count of concepts, e.g., one which imposes “context-free sets of necessary and
sufficient conditions on category membership” (p.17), involves taking on empirical
commitments which have little support from current findings.
In sum: Weinberg and Alexander present some problems one might face if
one characterises intuitions in a thick way. These are problems one faces if one is
interested in defending intuitions against the empirical challenge.
*
Remember that my project is a little different. I want to know whether approaching
evaluative methodology with a thick or thin conception of intuitions makes a
difference to how useful the results of the evaluation will be to us in trying to
do philosophy better.11 Nonetheless, the considerations Weinberg and Alexander
make are relevant.
We want our evaluation to give verdicts about targets our colleagues can dis-
cern while philosophising. As Weinberg and Alexander note, thick conceptions run
the danger of making the target rather obscure from the armchair. Not all thick
conceptions face this problem. Phenomenology may be accessible from the arm-
chair, for instance. We should note, however, that such a characterisation could
face other difficulties, depending on the terms in which we want to conduct our
evaluation. Suppose the terms were to be such that the only appropriate way
to evaluate in those terms involved the empirical examination of intuitions. As
Weinberg and Alexander note, it is less clear that empirical work on ‘intuitions’
bears on intuitions conceived in such a manner. Depending on the particular phe-
nomenological conditions imposed, it could be rather difficult to ensure that one
was evaluating one’s intended target; if you set out to evaluate intuitions (charac-
terised thickly with certain phenomenological restriction), that might not be an
achievable task. This is only a potential problem. It should not prevent us from
considering such characterisations. However, we should bear in mind that it is
not just being able to tell intuition from non-intuition from the armchair which
counts, but also being able to do so when performing the evaluation, for it may be
that evaluations of intuitions are not best performed from the armchair. The po-
tential problem is not faced only by phenomenologically-specified thick accounts.
Accounts which demand a particular etiology, e.g., deriving from a competence,
threaten to make it difficult to distinguish intuitions from non-intuitions while
evaluating them as well. Accounts that require a given quantity or quality of re-
flection also threaten to make the empirical evaluation of intuitions very difficult
(the latter might require experiments which take decades!).
11 Of course, there will be further decisions to be made. If we go for a thick conception, we
will need to ask which. In fact, it is somewhat artificial to present the evaluative methodologist
as facing a choice between thick and thin at such a general level. However, it is illuminating
to think about what is at stake in approaching evaluative methodology with either kind of
conception in mind.
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In sum then, conceiving of intuitions thickly could make it difficult to assess
claims about the merits of intuitions. However, Weinberg and Alexander’s concerns
about thin conceptions are also apt; conceiving of intuitions in a thin way may leave
one (a) without resources to respond or avoid the restrictionist’s challenges and
(b) running the risk of ‘discounting important differences between various kinds
(e.g., memorial, introspective, perceptual, inferential, testimonial, and even more
narrowly construed intuitional kinds) of philosophical evidence – differences that
figure significantly into questions of reliability, defeasibility, and conflict resolution’
(Weinberg and Alexander: 4). I turn now to consider a distinction made clear in a
recent paper by Jennifer Nado. What she has to say makes it clear that adopting
a thin conception of intuitions doesn’t have to mean we face these costs, i.e., (a)
and (b).
4 Monoliths
The question to be addressed is whether we should evaluate intuitions monolith-
ically. The answer will loosely be that we shouldn’t. The idea of monoliths is
introduced by Nado (2012) who argues against the evaluation of monoliths.
Nado notes that the debate about whether intuitions are any good is often
framed in a particular way, and she proposes an alternative. According to this
typical way of framing the debate, the target of evaluation is assumed to be ‘a
monolith’:12
Though the criticisms and defenses of intuition which have arisen over the
past fifteen or so years are quite varied, there is a general – though admit-
tedly not universal – tendency to write as though the intuitive judgments
invoked by philosophers stand or fall together, and that their doing so will
be a consequence of the reliability or lack thereof of some unified mental
capacity called ‘intuition’. (Nado 2012: 3)
Suppose we accept that we should evaluate intuitions in terms of reliability. What is
the advantage to a non-monolithic approach? Nado motivates her preferred target-
ing strategy by noting that it is very plausible there is some form of ‘deep diversity’
among the psychological mechanisms underlying the various states philosophers
have called ‘intuitions’ (Nado 2012: 23). The point is that our psychology seems
to involve a lot of very domain-specific processing and it seems plausible that the
processes involved in certain intuitions will be completely unrelated from those
involved in certain other intuitions.13 Some of these processes might be reliable,
some might not.
Nado argues that this has consequences for advocates of the monolithic ap-
proach,
12 Nado doesn’t claim all philosophers think intuition is to be evaluated monolithically but
rather that this seems to be the default way of framing the debate. I am inclined to agree the
debate does get framed this way, but won’t defend this claim. Another similar way the debate
gets framed is by pitting Restrictionist against Cathedrist (e.g., Weinberg et al. 2010), i.e., by
characterising those in the debate as pro- or anti-intuition simpliciter.
13 I don’t review the evidence Nado presents, nor the resultant picture of the mind. Suppose
it is broadly right that psychology is this way.
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. . . if there are in fact diverse psychological processes underlying different
subsets of ‘intuitive’ judgments, then philosophers in the business of arguing
for or against intuition need to provide arguments as to why reliability
assessment should not target these processes individually (p.26).
Indeed, if we add our motivation of wanting to be better philosophers to these
considerations, the need for advocates of the monolithic approach to defend their
approach is even more pressing; our motivation spurs a move away from monolithic
targets and towards more finely-carved targets. The reason is that doing so will
give you a richer source of good advice. The advice you get from a monolithic
evaluation is simply a resolute boo or hooray for the intuitive. More subtle advice,
however, allows you to avoid certain intuitions, and accept others—to separate
baby from bathwater.14
Two important questions now arise. How finely should the evaluative method-
ologist carve the monolith? And, to what grain? Nado is clear what the method
of carving should be: intuitions are to be carved according to the grain of the
psychology underpinning them.15 Given this, Nado thinks the carving will end up
being on the fine end of the scale. As, she thinks that psychological processing
is likely to pretty diverse. In the next section, I will challenge Nado’s answers to
these questions and answer them for myself.
To complete this section, let me make clear another advantage of a non-
monolithic evaluative strategy. In the previous section, we noted a number of
potential disadvantages of adopting a thin rather than thick conception of intu-
itions. Note that these disadvantages only face methodologists who are committed
to a non-discriminating monolithic approach to the evaluation of intuitions; this is
true regardless of the terms in which one evaluates—reliability, beauty, what-have-
you. The worries were that on adopting a thin conception we might lose out on
important distinctions between types of intuitions nor the opportunity to respond
to the restrictionist by questioning their failure to discriminate. But we don’t; one
can have a thin conception of intuition, yet be prepared to discriminate.16 I could
14 I take it few people really think all intuitions deserve a negative evaluation, certainly given
a thin conception of intuitions. Nonetheless, if all intuitions deserve a negative evaluation, the
approach I recommend doesn’t prevent us from finding that out. One might, for example, find
that there is an unreliable mechanism at the heart of all our intuition generating processes.
The rejection of the monolithic approach is a rejection of being committed to only evaluating
intuitions en bloc.
15 I should note that Nado says some things which suggest she thinks the carving might result
in categories “like ‘moral intuition’, ‘epistemological intuition’, and so forth”. However, even
in this case, she qualifies it: “This is indeed one possible way to re-carve the intuitive terrain,
but I wish to emphasize that it is not the only possible approach. In fact, the evidence reviewed
above suggests that the actual situation may be far more complicated; even within domains like
moral or logical cognition, substantially different types of processing may be involved. If this is
right, the epistemological features of philosophical methodology may be even more complex.”
(p.22-23)
16 One genuine loss involved in adopting a thin conception is that of a rhetorical device.
Thin conceptions of intuitions make claims like ‘the evidence you present doesn’t show that
intuitions are unreliable’ somewhat implausible, and being able to say such things is an asset
to the restrictionist’s opponent. However, while natty turns of phrase are nice, they don’t
constitute strong reasons to adopt a view. One still make the same points if you conceive
of intuitions thinly, e.g., ‘the evidence you present shows that some intuitions are unreliable,
but doesn’t show that [a particular subset of intuitions which I use in philosophising] are
unreliable’.
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treat my cat as a type of intuition. But this wouldn’t commit me to giving a single
evaluation for all intuitions (including my cat).
5 Carving
Evaluating monoliths, or at least, being committed to a monolithic evaluation,
seems like a bad idea. However, it seems that there might be something to be
said against Nado’s method of carving. Weinberg (2007) proposes an alternative:
carving according to subject matter. While Weinberg is generally down on intu-
itions, he admits intuitions about some particular subjects might make the cut;
to whit, mathematical and logical intuitions, intuitions which are partly consti-
tutive of folk psychology, and intuitions about epistemic norms. Our appeals to
intuition in these domains are okay, he thinks, because we have, with respect to
these subdomains, the resources to help detect and avoid their error within our
practices.
So Weinberg’s approach differs in a number of respects to Nado’s. The targeting
differs: what we should be evaluating is not intuitions themselves (or the capacities
which produce them), but philosophers’ practice of appealing to intuitions. But the
suggested terms also seem to differ. Certainly he thinks that brute level of reliabil-
ity of intuitions in a subdomain doesn’t itself tell you how much you should trust
them. The idea is that use of a source which is, say, 60% reliable might be okay, if
our practices are such that we are capable of detecting and avoiding its mistakes,
but not okay otherwise. So, Weinberg opts rather to evaluate in terms of some
feature of our practice (which he calls ‘hopefulness’)—the ability to detect and
avoid error.17 Given that Weinberg thinks we should be evaluating philosophers’
practice of appealing to intuitions in terms of hopefulness/hopelessness, it is clear
why he advocates carving by subdiscipline. Nonetheless, this method of carving is
worth considering, even if we don’t agree that the target of the evaluation should
be practices or that the terms should hopefulness/hopelessness.
Our guiding thought has been that our method of evaluating intuitions ought to
be such that its deliverances can help us be more responsible philosophers—better
philosophers. I argued that should mean that we want evaluations we can use
to guide our practice. Consequently, what matters is that the discriminations we
make in our evaluating of intuitions (in our carving) are by and large distinctions to
which we are sensitive in the process of our philosophising. Suppose, for example,
that experimental philosophers find that subjects’ responses to a certain thought
experiment X show variation which cannot be explained away. The reason this is
potentially helpful information is that we are sensitive to the distinction between
X and other thought experiments. I don’t mean that we are ordinarily sensitive
to the fact that intuitions about X have this variability. I mean simply that we
can tell the difference between thought experiments. We can resolve not to use
17 In fact, it isn’t clear the distinction between hopeful and hopeless practices doesn’t amount
to the distinction between having reliable and unreliable practices. However, I won’t argue
for this here. Others have noted close connections between the reliability of source and the
hopefulness of our relying on that source (see Brown 2011; Horvath 2010), although, not the
apparent equivalence of considerations of hope and reliability (at the level of our use of a
source).
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intuitions about X because we can tell which thought experiments are instances
of X.
Nado’s approach doesn’t fare well in this light. Since we are typically not
sensitive to the precise etiology of our intuitions, information about the reliability
or otherwise of the various psychological mechanisms which produce intuitions will
not be of much help in, e.g., assigning evidential weights to intuitions.18
This is not to say that such information can never be helpful. Insofar as we
are sensitive in our philosophising to the grain of the psychology of intuitions, our
evaluative strategy should feel free to make those distinctions too.19 However, I
see no reason to restrict our discriminating to psychological grounds. But, nei-
ther is there any reason to stop at the distinctions we can make between various
subdisciplines. We are aware of many things about our intuitions: the speed of
intuiting, the amount of deliberation we take in coming to have an intuition, the
light levels at the time of the intuiting, the general subject matter of the intuition
(e.g., epistemology), the specific subject matter (e.g., a fake barn case), our ap-
proximate level of expertise in that subject matter, the wording we use, etc. These
distinctions could be epistemically relevant—in the sense that they could help sort
wheat from chaff—even if they don’t carve up our psychological mechanisms in
any psychologically important or principled way (and despite not necessarily being
distinctions which are obviously of intrinsic epistemic relevance).
So, this is where the guiding thought has lead us. If we want an evaluative
methodology whose results will help us be better philosophers and do better phi-
losophy, it seems we should start with a thin conception of intuitions, but be
prepared to carve, avoiding a monolithic evaluation of intuitions, and to take ad-
vantage of any distinctions so long as we are capable of tracking those distinctions
in the process of our philosophising. Doing this will ensure that the information we
get can be of use in improving our practice.20 For example, we can track whether
or not we are thinking about cases involving features which are personally very
emotionally involving. Consequently, information about the comparative stability
of judgements about such cases is information which I could use in deciding how
much credence to place in my various intuitions.
Note that my claims here in no way entail that evaluative methodology should
be an affair confined to the armchair. Indeed that is a proposal to which I am not
in the least friendly. Evaluative methodologists should carve intuitions according
to distinctions which can be tracked from the armchair, but they likely shouldn’t
do it from the armchair. We can track the distinction between intuitions about
18 An anonymous referee thought this might be irrelevant as it isn’t within the remit of
philosophy to be sensitive to etiology in this way. (1) I don’t agree, and (2) my point here isn’t
to say that philosophers aren’t doing their job, it is simply that we can’t tell which intuitions
come from which mechanisms (by and large) and that, accordingly, knowing, for instance, that
intuitions from mechanisms XYZ are unreliable, won’t be of any help, as we can’t identify
which intuitions come from those mechanisms.
19 Moreover, I don’t mean to be dismissive about the extent to which we can be sensitive to
etiology. For instance, if it turned out that intuitions from process A made my ears wiggle and
intuitions from other processes didn’t, then I could track this distinction from the armchair.
I don’t intend to restrict the methodologist to investigating distinctions between intuitions
with etiologies which, for example, present themselves in the content of the intuitions, or are
otherwise directly introspectable.
20 Remember that this conclusion concerns only how one should think about intuitions when
doing evaluative methodology. It is not advocated, on this basis, as the correct account as to
what intuitions actaully are.
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logic and intuitions about epistemology from the armchair, but we likely can’t
gather the sort of data we would need to evaluate those categories of intuition
wihtout some empirical enquiry.
*
One interesting possibility which it is worth discussing briefly is the idea of in-
tuitional prosthetic aids (IPAs).21 An IPA is a device which one can use in the
process of philosophising that provides you with information about your intuitions
which would not be otherwise available to you. Suppose that our intuitions are
less reliable when our blood sugar falls below a certain level. Information about
our precise blood sugar level is not typically available to us from the armchair.
Consequently, the considerations so far in this paper would suggest that the evalu-
ative methodologists ought not to concern themselves with the distinction between
intuitions when one’s blood sugar is at certain levels. However, if there was the
possibility of an IPA, a pager that sat in one’s top pocket and monitored one’s
blood sugar level, then perhaps evaluative methodologists would not be wasting
their time with such distinctions. Just because a distinction is typically not acces-
sible from the armchair, doesn’t mean that it might not be with the aid of a cheap
and easy prosthetic. I think this is right and so perhaps the view as stated above
needs to be relaxed slightly: the distinctions with which the evaluative method-
ologist should bother are those to which philosophers are typically sensitive and
perhaps those to which they could be sensitive with judicious use of a cheap and
easy prosthetic. An IPA could be something simple as a short questionnaire to
judge mood—something which philosophers could use easily, but don’t.22
6 So what?
The main objection I foresee is that it is unclear who would contest my main
claims. One reason for this might be that, to some degree, I am talking past
the literature which I cite. The various philosophers I cite above are typically not
involved in a debate about the best way to think about intuitions for future inquiry
about intuitional methods. This is due to the fact that extant debates about how
to think about intuitions do not have this focus. A second reason for this might
be that it is not clear what practical implications what I say has for would-be
evaluative methodologists. Let me briefly address both concerns.
While it is true that most debates about how to think about intuitions have
not been focused on how to think about them for future inquiry about intuitional
methods, I think this is a pity. That is not to say I think all debate about how to
characterise intuitions should have this focus. There are many reasons one might
21 Thanks to Jennifer Nagel for this suggestion.
22 An anonymous referee asks what empirical data I would allow an IPA to detect. The
answer is, in principle, any! The only restrictions will be practical ones. This is the reason why
I specified that IPAs must be cheap and easy. There is no point in evaluative methodologists
busying themselves with distinctions which philosophers could track while philosophising but
only with the help of an fMRI scanner. We can’t be expected to do all our philosophising
from within an fMRI machine. The information and advice provided should be able to be of
practical help to philosophers which necessitates that the devices required are not too expensive
or cumbersome to use.
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be interested in thinking about how to characterise intuition(s). The problem arises
with a failure to recognise that the questions of how one should characterise intu-
itions for future work in evaluative methodology and how to characterise intuition(s)
given other purposes are distinct. I think such a failure has been a distraction in the
debate (and, I suspect, has hindered the ability of evaluative methodology to help
us do philosophy better).23 Broadly, the way of thinking which I think leads to
problems is to think that when methodologists perform an evaluation, which has
to do with philosophers’ use of intuitions, it is of the utmost importance that they
characterise intuition(s) in the ‘correct’ way. (An analogy may be helpful. Here’s
one: Suppose you are trying to do something to tackle the gender imbalance in
philosophy. One could start by establishing a completely satisfactory theory of
gender in terms of ontology, psychology, etcetera. However, that seems like a mis-
take. What you want is strategies that work. and such strategies need not involve
a completely satisfactory account of gender.)
The failure to recognise that the two types of question are distinct is apparent
in a number of types of move in the methodological literature.
(1) It is fairly common to think that methodologists have made a big mistake
if the way that they characterise intuitions gets the psychology or metaphysics
of intuition(s) wrong—perhaps that their results are methodologically irrelevant
as a consequence. In other words, it is common to assume that the answer to
the question of how one should characterise intuitions for future work in evaluative
methodology must be same as the answer to the question of, for example, how one
should characterise intuitions if you want accurate psychological theory of intuitions.
The idea is apparent in the strong criticism of evaluative projects, in particu-
lar empirical evaluative projects, on the basis that the target of their evaluation
wasn’t really intuitions—criticism on the basis of a substantive account of what in-
tuitions are. Weinberg and Alexander (forthcoming) identify a number of culprits
in this respect: Bealer (1998) defends intuition-use against negative evaluations
made on empirical bases saying “although [the empirical findings of cognitive psy-
chologists] bear on “intuition” in an indiscriminate use of the term, they evidently
tell us little about the notion of intuition . . . which is relevant to the justificatory
practices . . . philosophy”; and Ludwig (2007) builds a response on the worry that
“responses to surveys about scenarios used in thought experiments are not ipso
facto intuitions”.24
But, while such criticisms could be very important vis-a`-vis any inferences
researchers want to make about the properties of intuition (given a character-
isation which properly captures, e.g., the psychological phenomenon), they are
much less important when it comes to what/whether we can learn about how to
do philosophy better. Having a loose/thin characterisation which doesn’t carefully
distinguish mental kinds, or marry easily with a thesis on the ontology of evidence,
just isn’t a good criticism of an evaluative project qua project whose purpose is to
23 My point is similar in kind to Nado’s. Nado (2012) notes that the methodological literature
has been distracted by the idea of a monolithic evaluation of intuitions. I note a similar
distraction.
24 Weinberg & Alexander themselves remain fairly quiet concerning how one should think
about intuitions independently of the dialectical implications of adopting certain conceptions
in the debate between cathedrist and restrictionist. Weinberg and Alexander (forthcoming)
mention also include Cullen (2010), Bengson (forthcoming), and Kauppinen (2007) among the
culprits.
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give us information which can help us in doing philosophy better. And, as I have
suggested, what we really care about in evaluative methodology is the latter.
Remember that I am not saying that approaching evaluative methodology of
intuitions by first establishing what exactly philosophers are talking about when
they talk about ‘intuitions’ is somehow inherently problematic. It is simply a
contingent fact that it seems very difficult to establish any such account. There
is a very real risk of getting bogged-down in debates which are really besides the
point: debates about, for example, whether intuitions are being mischaracterised
by certain parties in the debate. My point is simply that there is an alternative
approach which can avoid getting bogged-down in this way. One can set aside the
issue of what intuitions really are and ask how we should think about intuitions
when doing evaluative methodology and it turns out that we can quickly get clear
answers about the latter question.
(2) It is fairly common think that it is appropriate for a methodological evalua-
tion to target intuitions monolithically, simply in virtue of the fact that intuitions
are a distinct sui generis mental/psychological kind or a basic evidential source.
Nado identifies Bealer (1998) and Pust (2000) as making such assumptions.25 In
other words, it is assumed that once you have an answer to the question Whats the
best psychological/epistemic model of intuition? you have an answer to the question
How should one characterise intuitions for future evaluative methodology? But that
isn’t necessarily right. As Nado recognises, non-monolithic reliability assessments
of intuitions would provide more accurate assessments of the epistemic merits of
particular intuitions (than would assessments targeting the single category ‘in-
tuitions’). However, even Nado fails to quite appreciate that the real benefit to
methodologists to treating intuitions (somewhat) heterogeneously is that the re-
sults of their evaluations will be much more useful in working out how to improve
our philosophical practice. But, the matter of how evaluative methodologists tar-
get their evaluation doesn’t seem to be best decided by working out what mental
kinds there are, what our basic sources of evidence are, or even what psychological
mechanisms underlie our intuitions. Such concerns aren’t completely irrelevant,
but they oughtn’t to be in the driving seat. (They aren’t completely irrelevant
because such information might concern distinctions which can be tracked in the
process of philosophising. However, it is this latter concern which should be in the
driving seat).
(3) Methodologists have been recently criticised on the basis that philosophers
don’t really use intuitions. The potential impact of this criticism for evaluative
methodology should be clear: there is no methodological benefit to evaluating
things which philosophers don’t use.26 There is something wrong with this line
of thought, however. This sort of criticism must rely on some fairly substantive
account of what it would be to rely upon an intuition. If the claim is that philoso-
phers never use judgements about cases, then it is obviously false, for instance
(indeed, that simply isn’t what the folks leveling such criticism have in mind). So,
suppose that when doing some evaluative methodology we characterise intuitions
25 Other parties Nado identifies as being guilty of treating intuitions monolithically (or talking
as if they are doing so), don’t obviously have such principle in the background, e.g., Sosa (2007),
Cummins (1998), Weatherson (2003) and a number of experimental philosophers.
26 I take this to be the central point of Cappelen’s (2012) criticism of experimental philosophy,
although there are a lot of subtleties in Cappelen’s work too, which I don’t have time to get
in to.
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as simply as being judgements (no one would deny we use judgements in philos-
ophy). Even an evaluative project that targeted the various judgements we use
in philosophising would have a lot to contribute—identifying subclasses which we
want to avoid, and so on.
I don’t intend what I say here as a major criticism of the authors I have cited. As
I say, none of them are focused on the question of how the evaluative methodologist
should approach the project of evaluation. They are focused on other questions
too. And I don’t deny these questions are philosophically important or interesting.
It is interesting to ask what our basic sources of evidence are, what their epistemic
standing is, how best to taxonomise mental states, whether there is something
interesting to be said about the psychology underlying some of the things we call
intuitions, and so on. However, the evaluative methodologist doesn’t have to know
the answers to these questions, and the idea that the way evaluative methodologists
characterise intuitions has to get all these thing right has been a distraction in the
methodological literature (and, I suspect, led many to overlook the significance
and/or potential import of works in evaluative methodology). I am recommending
instead that the way the evaluative methodologist thinks about intuitions sets up
their evaluative project with the best potential to give philosophers good advice
about how to do philosophy better.27
Evaluative methodologists have not always approached the project of evaluat-
ing intuitions in the way I recommend. Some have fared well in certain respects—
comparatively thin conceptions of intuitions have been de rigueur among those
who evaluate intuitions empirically—and a fair amount of effort has been made by
some to avoid conducting the debate about the merits of intuitions in monolithic
terms, e.g., to limit the claims made by experimental methodologists to certain
subject areas (see Weinberg, Nichols & Stich 2001). However, concerted effort to
find factors we can track while philosophising which are relevant to, e.g., the re-
liability of our intuitions has been comparatively rare, and more research geared
towards giving us information which we can use to limit the variability of our
intuitions, for instance, would be great.
I have not yet made any positive suggestions about particular distinctions be-
tween intuitions the evaluative methodologist could fruitfully make. The main
reason for this has been that it will depend upon the terms in which one wishes to
evaluate. The distinctions you should pay attention to if you want beautiful meth-
ods, will be different from those you should look out for if you want cheap methods.
However, suppose, like many in the methodological literature, that we think that
27 I imagine that some will still want to object in the following way. Characterise intu-
itions incorrectly and when you go away and investigate ‘intuitions’ you won’t be conducting
a methodological examination of intuitions. That is important. You want to know about the
role of proof in philosophy, you better not end up looking at the role of evidence in philosophy.
We want to know about the role of intuitions in philosophy, and, that being so, it is really
important that methodologists are working with the right account of intuitions. First, let me
be clear that I think the way I claim we should think about intuitions in evaluative method-
ology is the correct way to think about them for that project—even if it doesn’t provide an
accurate characterisation of some special kind of mental state deserving of the label ‘intuition’.
However, if someone were really to insist that some other way of thinking about intuitions was
correct, then my response would be to distance myself from the project of doing the evaluative
methodology of intuitions. If the methodologist who takes my advice doesn’t end up doing the
evaluative methodology of intuitions, but of something else, then I am not too concerned. So
long as they produce information which we can use to make philosophy better, that’s what I
think is important—that’s what I think we all think is important.
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our evaluation should be broadly in terms of reliability. What distinctions might
it be useful to make?
One important place to look is at what philosophers have said about which sorts
of intuitions they deem to be particularly suspect—even if those philosophers make
the recommendations for other reasons (with which we might not agree).28 Here
are some examples: (i) “we shouldn’t appeal to intuitions generated in response to
thought-experiments whose content radically departs from ordinary experience”
(Alexander and Weinberg 2007 – attributed to Austin); (ii) “we shouldn’t appeal
to intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments that aren’t sketched
with sufficient detail” (Alexander and Weinberg 2007 – attributed to Austin); (iii)
one should avoid intuitions that are influenced by a theory of the target concept
(Goldman 2007); and (iv) “an intuition [which is prima facie justified] should
be immediate and unreflective, in the sense that it should not be the outcome
of considered thought” (Cohen 1986); (v) one should discard “judgements made
with hesitation, or in which we have little confidence . . . [and] those given when
we are upset or frightened . . . can be left aside” (Rawls 1972).29 Of course, we
should also think about the sorts of distinctions which philosophers can track
while philosophising. So, some of the suggestions just canvassed don’t look like
they will be very useful, e.g., it is likely rather difficult to determine when one’s
intuition is influenced by a theory of the target concept. In any case, in order to
use the distinction fruitfully, we would have to have some fairly easy way to work
out which of our intuitions were influenced by the target theory at the time of
the intuiting. However, some of suggestions look like they could be very useful.
To know to that intuitions about thought-experiments whose content radically
departs from ordinary experience, e.g., involving time travel, were particularly
susceptible to interpersonal and intrapersonal variation could be very helpful. (Of
course, whether such intuitions are susceptible in this way is an empirical question.
So, evaluative methodologists following such a path will have to do or at least draw
upon some empirical enquiry).
7 Wrapping up
I have outlined and provided some support for what I take to be a somewhat
obvious metamethodology of intuitions, albeit one which has not been at the fore
in philosophical methodology. We don’t need to have a completely satisfactory
account of intuitions in order to do good work in evaluative methodology of in-
tuitions. We don’t need to characterise intuitions in a way which would stand up
when taxonomising mental kinds or theorising about basic sources of justification.
28 A second suggestion might be to look at the empirical literature on intuitions in other
domains, e.g., Kahneman and Klein (2009). Of course, there are many reasons to be cautious
when doing this. Perhaps psychologists, financiers, weather forecasters, and so on, may not
be talking about the same ‘intuitions’ as us philosophers. Perhaps our practices are relevantly
different, e.g., intuitions (if they are used) in weather forecasting are used to predict the
future. Perhaps the empirical work has not been sufficiently careful to distinguish distinct
mental phenomena, etcetera. Nonetheless, making educated guesses about the distinctions
which might be relevant for our purposes, informed by looking at the distinctions found to be
relevant to the reliability of things called ‘intuitions’ in other areas, is an improvement on just
guessing.
29 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this last suggestion.
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This is good news for the evaluative methodologist. They don’t need to get bogged
down in tricky debates about what exactly intuitions are, etc. What we want from
an evaluation of intuition-use in philosophy is advice on how to do philosophy
better; getting bogged down in debates about what exactly intuitions are stops us
getting that—stops us getting what we wanted in the first place. I can’t emphasise
enough the extent to which this is good news for the evaluative methodologist:
metamethodogical reflection has revealed a principled defence of a particular con-
ception of intuitions to be used when doing evaluative methodology. Reflecting on
the fact that what we want from evaluative methodology is advice on how to do
philosophy better, we have arrived at firm conclusions about how to think about
intuitions when doing evaluative methodology. We can accept these conclusions
even if we don’t agree about how intuitions are best characterised when working
in other areas of philosophy. We should conceive of intuitions thinly, be prepared
to discriminate finely, and to carve to a grain to which, in the process of our
philosophising, we are sensitive (or could be with a cheap and easy prosthetic).
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